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Introduction 
In a sense, we have entered a new phase of Foucault’s reception. His 
lectures at the Collège de France have been published in their entirety. These 
lectures were given as part of his duties as the Chair of the History of Systems 
of Thought, a position he held from 1970 until his death in 1974. Intended to 
be public presentations of his work in progress, and so they give us some idea 
of the concerns that animated Foucault’s thought throughout this period. In 
places, they seem to fill in various caesurae left in the books. What more does 
Foucault have to say about the concept of “bio-power,” presented in 
frighteningly apocalyptic terms in The History of Sexuality and then dropped? 
How can the idea of “truth-telling,” of parrhesia, illuminate our conceptions of 
Foucault’s ethics? Did Foucault – the theorist of power – really do ethics?  
Before the publication of the lectures, it had become something of a 
commonplace, if not outright orthodoxy, in Foucault scholarship to divide his 
work into three periods. First, there is the “archaeological phase,” exemplified 
in The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
This “first” phase is set off from the second phase by an extended silence in 
publishing by Foucault, which is explained with reference to Foucault’s 
realization of the “methodological failure” of archaeology.1 This is followed 
by a second, “genealogical” phase, in which Foucault’s concerns are taken to 
shift from the autonomy of discourse and the production of knowledge to the 
effects and mechanisms of power. The monographs comprising this 
genealogical period are Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality. This genealogical period, similarly, is followed by a 
relative silence; Foucault publishes no major monographs between 1976 and 
1984. Then Foucault is taken to have had a “final” period, generally taken to 
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begin in the early 1980s and last until his death in 1984, during which he 
publishes the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Self. This final period is usually taken to signal an “ethical 
turn” in Foucault’s thought, though I will be concerned in this essay with 
challenging that characterization. 
 This periodization has been quite important. A good many 
interpretations of Foucault hinge on it. For one fascinating and fruitful 
example, in Timothy Rayner’s Foucault’s Heidegger, the “turn” or break 
between the genealogical and “ethical” works is simply taken as a datum to 
be explained (in this case, by appealing to Foucault’s latent 
Heideggereanism).2 Beyond the explosion of discussions of “Foucault’s 
ethics,” even some who explicitly distance themselves from it still make use 
of it. Jeffrey Nealon, despite the “caveat that ‘this periodization is only 
indicative and is discussed and criticized’” in his text, adopts it from Beatrice 
Han wholesale.3 Nealon’s ultimate claim, in fact, is that if Foucault eventually 
turned to ethics, so much the worse for Foucault.  
Indeed, perhaps even because of its generally unquestioned acceptance, 
explaining the apparent “rupture” between his “middle” and “late” period 
seems to be an urgent task in Foucault studies. Whereas there seems to be a 
more or less accepted explanation of the shift from archaeology to genealogy 
– the “methodological failure” of the former – there does not seem to be any 
established account of just what “moved” Foucault from his middle to late 
period.4 And the stakes, it appears, are high. Not only Foucault’s 
“archaeological” work, such as The Order of Things with its manifest hope that 
“man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea,”5 but 
his work of the mid-1970s on power, seem to construe the human subject as 
nothing more than a precipitate of strategies and mechanisms of power. 
Hence we subjects don’t seem to be capable of the sort of autonomy we 
normally desire in our practical and political lives. In particular, both 
Foucault’s followers and his critics often seem to worry that any subject 
produced by power in this way would be incapable of formulating - let alone 
practicing - an ethics that would allow for the substantive critique of, and 
practical resistance to, the objectionable forms and exercises of power in 
which we find ourselves trapped. Wouldn’t a turn to ethics, requiring - or so 
it is often alleged - an at least partially autonomous subject, fly in the face of 
all his previous work?  
 Most critically, the tacit acceptance of the thesis of an “ethical turn” in 
Foucault’s work has been put to use by many of his readers to suggest that 
not only is there a turn to ethics but a turn to a liberal or even neoliberal ethos 
on Foucault’s part.6 The basic idea behind this interpretation seems to be as 
follows. Foucault’s last lectures at the Collège de France, before he turned to 
Antiquity were primarily concerned with the development of various forms 
of neoliberalism (primarily German ordo-liberalism and American Chicago-
style economics).7 These lectures are not immediately or obviously critical, in 
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the way his earlier work on psychiatry or prisons were. In fact, the importance 
given to individual liberty in neoliberal schemas of government seemed to 
mirror the renewed importance of the individual some readers have found in 
Foucault’s late work. After all, neoliberalism aimed at combating the excesses 
of the welfare state, and the postwar social contract more generally, that 
Foucault’s genealogies of power in modern society had so forcefully 
undermined.8 So, the reasoning went, perhaps Foucault was in fact endorsing 
neoliberalism, or at the very least exploring its emancipatory potential, before 
finding a more satisfactory model in the Greek “aesthetics of the self.” 9 This 
reading found some support when Gary Becker, one of the economists 
Foucault discusses at some length in The Birth of Biopolitics, was unable to find 
anything but faithful description of his work in that text.10 The idea of a liberal 
turn in Foucault’s thought has even been used to explain other controversial 
aspects of his intellectual itinerary, such as his support for the Iranian 
Revolution.11 This has, in turn, led some of Foucault’s readers on the Left to 
question the importance or relevance of Foucault’s thought for contemporary 
problems.12 So, we see, however far we think we have moved beyond the 
orthodox view of Foucault’s positions, it is still powerfully shapes even the 
reception of the lectures that, prima facie, present a more continuous body of 
work.  
What I hope to do, however, is to undermine the periodiziation that 
makes the “liberal” or “neoliberal Foucault” possible: in particular, the 
positing of a “turn” in Foucault’s thought from genealogy to ethics. In the first 
part of this essay, I explain how this periodization has emerged out of 
Foucault’s own reflections on his work, which have subsequently been 
interpreted as responses to his earlier critics. I then show that characterizing 
Foucault’s late works as a “turn to ethics” is premature and unwarranted in 
light of the vast array of textual evidence to the contrary. Rather, we shall see 
that there is a constant concern with how truth-telling and its norms shape us 
as subjects, for better or worse. Foucault’s discussions of neoliberalism fit into 
this pattern as well. The upshot is this: if there is no “ethical turn,” then there 
is likely no liberal or neoliberal turn, either. Instead of either worrying about 
the positions to which some sort of Foucauldian ethics might commit us or 
praising them for overcoming the constraints of conventional morality, we 
might do better to try to understand how Foucault thought – as he clearly did 
– that our commitment to truth-telling, or “veridiction,” impacts our 
comportment more broadly.  
The Three Axes of Historical Ontology and Foucault’s 
“Ethics” 
In 1984, at the very end of his life, Foucault in several venues gives us a 
brief overview of his work as comprising a singular project. In “What is 
Enlightenment?” Foucault poses the questions – in their most general forms – 
that have guided him through his career: “How are we constituted as subjects 
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of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or 
submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our 
own actions?”13 So, we have an account from Foucault in which he explains 
his project as, all along, a unified one taking place along thre “axes” of 
investigation, axes that clearly seem to respectively correspond to Foucault’s 
archaeologies of the 1960s, his genealogical works of the early and mid-70s, 
and whatever it is that he’s doing from roughly 1979 onward.  
Famously, one of the names given to this project is “historical ontology,” 
or the “historical ontology of ourselves.” As the name suggests, the historical 
ontology of ourselves is, ultimately, about figuring out who we are now. This 
is ontological, insofar as Foucault thinks that we are constituted in our very 
being as subjects, of knowledge, power, and our own action. Characterized 
thusly, and without a detailed exegesis of how such “constitution” actually 
occurs, Foucault’s project seems anodyne, and even traditional. It echoes the 
Delphic imperative to know oneself, only with the proviso that to know 
oneself requires us to know who we have become, and how. While Foucault 
might share this aim with Socrates, he also more explicitly links his works to 
some of Kant’s “occasional” writings. According to Foucault, the new line of 
inquiry Kant opens up in his answer to the question “What is 
Enlightenment?” is, in essence, “What just happened?”  
 For Foucault, when Kant asks “What is Enlightenment?” he is asking 
“What is this thing that has just happened to us?” But in asking this, Kant is 
not merely reporting on current events, not narrating a story in which we 
simply happen to be embroiled as characters. The (allegedly) Kantian 
innovation, which explicitly orients Foucault’s work, is in taking some 
historical event to be of ontological import; as new ways of subjecting 
ourselves to knowledge, power, and action become available to and - 
sometimes - obligatory for us, we are altered as subjects. It is in making the 
question of what has just happened to us an essential dimension of the 
question of who one is that Foucault historicizes his ontology, or, for that 
matter, ontologizes his history.  
If “historical ontology” is the guiding thread in Foucault’s inquiries, it 
involves, in general, figuring out who we are by investigating how we have 
become – that is, been constituted as – the subjects we are. And we are 
constituted thus in three ways: namely, as subjects (and objects) of our own 
knowledge, as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations, and as 
(moral or ethical) subjects of our own action. This is the picture that Foucault 
gives us in “What is Enlightenment?” And many of Foucault’s commentators 
have taken Foucault’s investigation of the first axis to comprise his 
“archaeological” work, or perhaps even an “archaeological method.” 
Similarly, the second axis is supposed to be somehow related to “genealogy,” 
to Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality. 
Conveniently, these distinctions seem to correspond fairly neatly to a 
chronological periodization of Foucault’s work; an “archaeological phase” in 
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the 1960s, a “genealogical” phase in the 1970s, which then might be followed 
by some third phase in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, these periods being 
identifiable by gaps between major monographs. But it’s not exactly clear how 
these different characterizations fit together, or what the objects of Foucault’s 
descriptions are. One might be tempted to ask, if there are these three 
distinctions to be made in Foucault’s work, and the first two might be 
subsumed under the terms “archaeology” and “genealogy,” respectively, 
then how would we characterize the third axis?  
The most prominent way of doing so has been as a “turn” to “ethics.” In 
other words, Foucault’s analytic distinction between the three axes of 
investigation is superimposed on a developmental reading of his work, such 
that the shift in apparent subject-matter from investigating technologies of 
power to those of subject formation is also read as a chronological division. 
This is already a loaded interpretive choice, and it has had nontrivial 
consequences. While the unity of “historical ontology” has often been 
overlooked, the division of Foucault’s work along the three axes of 
archaeology, genealogy, and ethics has been a very influential way of 
describing his project, tacitly shaping his reception. Paul Rabinow has used it 
to organize the three volumes of Foucault’s “essential works” in English. It 
has been adopted by Arnold Davidson, the general editor of the English 
translations of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, for example, in 
“Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics.”14  
As stated, the primary evidence for this alleged turn is generally taken to 
be the prima facie dramatic shift in historical focus; instead of focusing on the 
period between the renaissance and the twentieth century – the whole period 
of which was the focus of The Order of Things, the main data for both The 
History of Madness and Discipline and Punish being taken from this period, and 
the 19th century being the historical focus of the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality – Foucault looks back to Antiquity and, strikingly, to the more or less 
explicitly “ethical” dimensions of subject-formation expressed in prominent 
Greek and Latin philosophy. Thus many have arrived at archaeology, 
genealogy, and ethics as Foucault’s three “methods” or “projects,” while, in 
general, ignoring the unity of historical ontology. Consequently, a good 
number of Foucault’s commentators think that, in his final years, Foucault 
was “giving us” an ethics, namely, an “aesthetics of existence” or “ethics of 
the care of the self,” that either takes as imperative that subjects “work on 
themselves,” transforming themselves into “beautiful” human beings, or at 
least emphasizes our capacity to do so. 
  Some of Foucault’s followers are fully on board with this purported 
ethical project.15 But others are less satisfied with the ethics of the care of the 
self. Arnold Davidson, for example, thinks that Foucault is not merely doing 
ethics, but radically transforming how we ought to do ethics; he thinks this 
transformation a salutary one. Davidson thinks that Foucault shows us that 
we should think about the history of (philosophical) ethics as a type of 
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asceticism, that is, as a matter of techniques of the self aimed at transforming 
us into different sorts of ethical subjects. He calls this Foucault’s 
“conceptualization” of ancient ethics, one that also makes possible a 
contemporary form “ethics as ascetics,” to which he gives his qualified 
endorsement.16 Nevertheless, Davidson admits that Foucault’s investigations 
of modes and practices of ethical self-formation in Antiquity are perhaps too 
“aestheticized,” too akin to a Baudelairean dandysme. In raising this concern, 
Davidson is being sensitive to Pierre Hadot’s criticism of Foucault, namely, 
the charge that Foucault ignores the ways in which ancient schools of 
philosophy thought of ethical self-formation as a way of making oneself 
answerable to the structure of the world, its rational structure, and not as a 
freewheeling process of self-creation guided by amoral and individualistic 
aesthetic criteria like “beauty.” The world has a rational moral structure, for 
the ancients, that makes a claim on all rational agents, so that, for example, 
Stoic asceticism is a matter of bringing oneself into a truly universal 
community, with objective or at least intersubjectively valid criteria for 
(moral) action. Davidson’s response is to concede that Foucault’s 
“interpretation” of the Greeks is untoward, but that conceptualizing ethics as, 
primarily or perhaps even exclusively, a matter of ascetics or self-fashioning 
is the correct way to proceed.  
 Let us consider Hadot’s objection in more detail. It is, on the one hand, 
an historiographical complaint; Foucault is not getting the ancients right. In 
presenting a picture of Stoic “technologies of the self,” for example, as focused 
on attaining pleasure or joy in oneself through various ascetic disciplines 
without an acknowledgement of the dimension of the universality of the 
Reason to which the Stoics aspire, Foucault does them a disservice. On the 
other hand, Hadot acknowledges that his historiographical complaint is in the 
service of an ethical complaint. That is to say, he is expressing a worry about 
the moral consequences of an excessive attention to the “aesthetic” dimension 
of ancient practices of ethical self-formation. Hadot claims that he is himself 
looking to the ancients for “alternatives” to our contemporary way of being 
in the world. As he puts it: 
All these observations which I have just made are not to be 
situated only in the framework of an historical analysis of 
ancient philosophy; they are aimed also at the definition of 
the ethical model which modern man might discover in 
Antiquity.17  
And, he thinks, Foucault is doing the same thing. The trouble for Hadot and 
Davidson is that Foucault’s turn to the Greeks for a model of ethical 
subjectivity that might be relevant today doesn’t end up being ethical enough. 
The project is too self-involved, too self-interested; the “care of the self” that 
rejects the Whole of which that Self is but a part can only be an egoism.  
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 Though I focus on a relatively minor quibble between Davidson and 
Hadot, the basic positions here are representative. There are many who think 
that Foucault’s turn to an “aesthetics of existence” is deeply unsatisfactory as 
an ethics, who nevertheless are by and large sympathetic to the 
conceptualization of an “art of living” or technologies of self-formation as the 
primary matter of a philosophical ethics. If not egoism, the emphasis on Greek 
“aesthetic” self-fashioning may seem off-putting to many for other reasons: it 
is the privileged mode of existence of (a) slave-owning (b) white European 
males, focused on (c) male pleasure at the expense of female agency; or, 
perhaps, it is simply off-topic, as the 18th century concept of “aesthetics” that 
we have inherited has its own sort of autonomy from ethics or morality, and 
hence an “aesthetics of existence” could only be amoral; or, as some have 
noted, and especially in light of Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism, it 
seems that the mode of individualistic self-formation Foucault appears to 
endorse in the Greeks is too close to the sort of libertarian individualism 
demanded and produced by our (neo-)liberal present, and inimical to the 
sorts of moral solidarity required for concerted collective/social action. 
What’s lacking, for these commentators, is a satisfactory set of principles or 
rules or virtues by which our “art of living” - for thematizing which Foucault 
rightly deserves credit - might be adequate to the contemporary moral 
landscape; one’s life ought to be thought of as a work of art, but not one that 
only seeks to embody aesthetic values. One’s life ought to be a work of moral 
art.  
 A similar worry arises for those for whom the very conceptualization of 
ethics as ascetics is problematic, who think that any turn to “ascetics” or “self-
fashioning” will inevitably fail to be properly moral or ethical. Perhaps most 
hysterically in this vein is Richard Wolin, but even sympathetic critics might 
think that Foucault proffers only an anemic, inadequate ethics.18 The worry, I 
take it, is that if Foucault is putting forward an ethics of the “care of the self,” 
or “aesthetics of existence,” it will inevitably be inadequate because 
recommending such an ethos, such a self-directed project, is just orthogonal 
to what first-order ethics normative ethics is. What ethics, in this sense, is 
supposed to do is to help us figure out what’s right and what’s wrong, which 
in turn enables us to figure out what to do. Foucault’s ethics doesn’t suffice 
for providing this sort of normative guidance when confronted with pressing 
contemporary problems. For example, Dianna Taylor has recently discussed 
her experiences of being confronted by many among the community of 
feminist scholars for whom Foucault is a disappointment because in some 
sense his work “is not normative” in this respect.19 It doesn’t help us see what 
we ought to do when, for example, we confront pressing issues of social 
justice, to be told that we ought to live our lives as works of art. If Foucault is 
giving us an ethics, one of the most important means of evaluating it would 
be to see what guidance would be offered to us in salient, morally-charged 
situations, and it’s not clear that they would fare well.  
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 A similar, but distinct, problem troubles those critics and commentators 
who think that Foucault’s ethics are somehow inadequate or problematic for 
his own project. The idea is that Foucault’s ethics just does not answer to the 
problems that Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, gently point out, such that, 
after pointing out to us the possibility that we are living in a “carceral” society, 
and one in which we subject to something called “bio-politics” (this being 
linked to both the Nazi camps and the Soviet purges), Foucault calling us to 
“live our lives as works of art” is at best not really a solution to those problems 
but just the exchange of one “dangerous” way of living for another. Rainer 
Rochlitz is less reserved when he states, not without some justification, that 
“[t]here is something laughable about Foucault’s proposing a new way of 
living if we continue to bear in mind the threats of genocide he had 
brandished some years earlier. If some social minority decided to set about 
making its life a work of art, this would hardly be a matter of concern for a 
power apparatus of this nature.”20 In short, Foucault’s “ethics” is simply not 
up to the task of freeing us from the snares of power within which he himself 
had so effectively convinced us that we are trapped. At best, he simply 
changes the subject.   
 Finally, there are those who simply think that Foucault contradicts 
himself. The exact nature of the contradiction varies from critic to critic. As an 
example, James Porter might fall in this category. Like Hadot, he is a classicist 
and aims to raise a historiographical complaint. Again like Hadot, however, 
the historical criticism is motivated by moral concerns, claiming that 
“Foucault’s genealogy of the modern self has more than a historical 
dimension: it also has a moral dimension.”21 The problem, as Porter sees it, is 
that Foucault tries to do too much with the concept of asceticism, or self-
formation, simultaneously wanting to explain contemporary political 
dilemmas and deadlocks as arising out of attitudes, stances, and rationalities 
that emerge from Christian asceticism (perhaps in the same spirit as Weber), 
while at the same time tracing these forms of asceticism to laudable pre-
Christian and Greek and Roman practices of “self-fashioning.” Porter worries 
that there might be some sort of inconsistency or incoherence here, in that 
ancient practices of asceticism are supposed to lie both at the root of our 
contemporary, oppressive social situation and to bespeak the possibility of 
greater freedom than we currently enjoy.  
 Porter’s complaint mirrors those by Critical Theorists regarding 
Foucault’s genealogical works.22 In broad terms, the complaint is that the 
targets of Foucault’s critiques are precisely the sorts of things - norms, 
practices, and institutions - in which one would hope to find resources for 
resisting the indignities and injustices of contemporary society, somehow 
implicating them in our own oppression, such that appeal to them could only 
be self-defeating. The Critical Theorists here are particularly concerned that 
among Foucault’s targets are rationality itself, or humanism, or the most 
valuable elements of the liberal tradition. Nancy Fraser puts it most forcefully:  
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[Consider] the disciplinary or carceral society described in 
Discipline and Punish. If one asks what exactly is wrong with 
that society, Kantian notions leap immediately to mind. 
One cannot help but appeal to such concepts as the 
violation of dignity and autonomy involved in the treating 
of persons solely as means to be causally manipulated. But 
again, these Kantian notions are clearly related to the liberal 
norms of legitimacy and illegitimacy defined in terms of 
limits and rights…Given that there is no other normative 
framework apparent in Foucault’s writings, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the liberal framework has not 
been fully suspended. But if this is so, Foucault is caught in 
an outright contradiction, for he, even more than Marx, 
tends to treat that framework as simply an instrument of 
domination.23 
Porter and Fraser both draw out attention to the fact that the very things at 
which Foucault seems to gesture as possible sources of normative guidance - 
ancient asceticism or liberal frameworks - are swallowed up as part of the 
problem with respect we need to be guided. 
 Whether or not they think that Foucault’s “turn” to ethics are 
insufficient in general, or for his own project, or just inconsistent with his prior 
work, almost all of these commentators agree that there is a shift of some sort, 
not just between the periods on which Foucault focused his investigations, 
but also in the object and aim of his investigations. Not only do they agree 
that the aims and objects of Foucault’s investigations change radically 
sometime between 1977 and 1982 but, further, that he moves from a clinical, 
genealogical investigation of insidious “power-relations” permeating society 
to providing for us at least the rudimentary outlines of an ethics inspired by 
Greek and Roman practices of self-mastery. This outline has been embraced 
(e.g. O’Leary), subjected to sympathetic revision (Hadot, Davidson), 
denounced (Wolin, Rochlitz and others), and accused of some sort of 
incoherence (Porter, Fraser). This might seem a trivial point; obviously, 
everyone who has a stance on Foucault’s ethics thinks that Foucault is 
providing an ethics. But it does not follow from the fact that there is a change 
in emphasis in Foucault’s writing that he has simply started to do “ethics.” As 
I shall now try to show, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that whatever 
Foucault was doing from the late 1970s onward, he was not doing ethics.  
Against the Illusion of an Ethical Turn 
 As mentioned, Foucault’s characterization of his project as an 
“historical ontology,” with three different “axes,” suggests a more-or-less 
chronological division between Foucault’s explicit projects of “archaeology” 
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and “genealogy” and a third axis.24 He was, in the 1960s, by his own 
admission doing something called “archaeology,” which seemed to be 
followed, in the 1970s, by something called “genealogy.” Between these two 
there is a lengthy gap between books, and an apparent change in focus from 
the structures of discourse to concrete practices of domination, to 
“power/knowledge.” And his late work in the 1980s is both fairly forthrightly 
concerned with ethics, even if ancient ethics, and separated from his explicit 
work on power/knowledge by a break between monographs very similar to 
that between his “archaeological” and “genealogical” periods. So, the line of 
reasoning might go, he must be doing ethics, as it follows after genealogy just 
as genealogy followed after archaeology.  
 Unfortunately, this is unsatisfactory for a panoply of reasons, and I 
apologize for what will no doubt seem like an avalanche of textual evidence 
against the alleged “ethical turn.” Granted, not all of these writings would 
have been available to Foucault’s critics in the 1970s and 1980s. But the theme 
of Foucault’s ethics has persisted long since then and seems so sturdily 
constructed as to require making this point with a hammer.  
 First of all, if the reasoning above is in fact that of his commentators, it 
suffers from some formal deficiencies. It would be inappropriate, on this view, 
to label his late work an “ethics,” for the same reason we do not take his early 
work to be offering a “knowledge” or his middle work to be a “power.” It is 
not even obvious, for that matter, that Foucault is giving a theory of 
knowledge or a theory of power. Though Foucault in some sense takes 
knowledge and power as the objects of his investigations, he is certainly not 
putting forward theories of what knowledge and power should be. Similarly, 
we might want to say that Foucault is putting forward a meta-ethics, that is, 
he is talking about ethics, and telling us something significant about what it 
is to be an ethical agent, and indeed he is, but that is different from putting 
forward a first-order, normative ethics proper. There is no a priori requirement 
of meta-ethical philosophy that first-order normative principles follow from 
its analyses, whether of the content of moral utterances or the source of 
normativity or the nature of moral agency or whatever.  
 Beyond this perhaps niggling objection, we might object further that, 
indeed, Foucault never characterizes his work as comprising the axes of 
archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. And, in fact, in one of the earliest versions 
of what would eventually become the essay “What is Enlightenment?” – from 
which the three-axis characterization of his work is often drawn – Foucault 
explicitly does otherwise. In the interview that has been published as “What 
is Critique?” given in 1978, Foucault gives us one of his first attempts at 
linking his thought to the sorts of historical and philosophical concerns that 
Kant raises in his famous essay. And, in this text, he also discusses the three 
axes of his investigations: these comprise archaeology, genealogy, and 
something called “strategics,” which involve – precisely – the manners in 
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which relations of power can be intensified, solidified or reversed and 
transformed.25  
 Of course, one might respond as follows. “It’s all well and good that 
Foucault prospectively – in 1978 – takes the emerging third axis of his 
investigation to be focused on strategies and tactics, deployments and 
reversals of power-relations; it nevertheless turned out that what he was 
interested in, that what came to be the third axis of his investigations, was 
precisely an ethics, that is,  a new way of answering the question “How ought 
one (or I) live?” And he came to this by returning to the Greeks, who at least 
give us some way of understanding how to live that contrasts with the clearly 
insufficient ways that now command currency. How else are we to explain 
his focus precisely on Greek and Roman ethics, and precisely on the priority 
of (aesthetic) dimension of self-shaping in them?”26 
 There are two things to be said here. First, it’s not at all clear that 
Foucault’s attitude changed. In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault’s final 
word on Kant, much of the material from “What is Critique?” remains. But 
even more strikingly it reproduces exactly much of the material comprising 
the first two lectures of the series at the Collège de France under the title “The 
Government of Self and Others”, delivered in 1983. What we find there is yet 
another description of his work along three axes. Predictably, the first two 
axes deal with knowledge and power. And, it is true, we do not find Foucault 
claiming that “strategics” constitutes the third axis of his investigations. But 
it is also true that we do not find Foucault claiming anything about ethics; 
rather, his stated “third axis” is concerned with “pragmatics,” the “pragmatics 
of self.” Foucault is interested in “the different forms by which the individual 
is led to constitute him or herself as subject.”27 Now, even if our ethical 
practices - or those of the Greeks and Romans - are one set of those practices, 
of which one can study the pragmatics, nothing about the “pragmatics of the 
subject” immediately implies that Foucault is doing ethics. It seems that if 
there were ever a time for Foucault to own up to doing ethics, or even to 
suggest obliquely that he was doing so, it was this. And yet he demurred.  
This is perhaps because it is not even clear that Foucault’s turn to the 
ancients is primarily focused around “ethics” or an aesthetic mode of self-
cultivation, fashioning or formation. Foucault certainly did have positive 
things to say about fashioning one’s life as a work of art, but – at least with 
respect to his published writings – they are usually in the form of occasional 
remarks, sometimes linked to a Kantian philosophical ethos that he had been 
exploring on and off for over half a decade, or linked to the more concrete and 
pressing issues of gay liberation, or simply as a theoretical response to the 
“fact that the self is not given.”28 But this hardly amounts to anything like a 
focus on such issues, let alone an ethics built on them. After all, it is hardly the 
case that the aesthetics of the self were the only things to which Foucault gave 
a positive assessment, even qua practices or discourses of resistance against 
power. He was not averse to providing, at any given juncture in his career, 
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elliptical remarks concerning “overcoming” or “resistance.” As early as The 
History of Madness, Foucault seemed to think that there was something 
positive and meaningful in, for example, the Renaissance experience of 
madness, even if many therefore took him to task for appearing to attempt to 
liberate an “essence” of madness that would exist beneath any oppressive 
discursive formation. In The Order of Things, Foucault makes positive remarks 
about the powers of a modern “literature” that was gathering strength in the 
twilight of the modern episteme, and would sweep the figure of “Man” from 
the center of discourse. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault puts a positive spin 
on prison revolts and 19th century anarcho-socialist rejections of the prison 
system. In “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault explicitly praises the 
discourse of race war, of all things, for its critical, resistive potential, its 
function as a “counter-history” and – perhaps most striking – its evocation of 
a Biblical, prophetic voice and style of enunciation in contrast to the juridical 
or “politico-legendary” style of history linked to the Roman Empire. There is 
the notorious suggestion, in La Volonté de Savoir, that we elaborate a new 
economy of “bodies and pleasures” in opposition to the apparatus of sexuality 
and its “logic of desire.” In the later 1970s, Foucault’s apparent 
commendations multiplied and diversified: for example, his consistent appeal 
to human rights (on behalf of Vietnamese asylum-seekers, Polish Solidarnosc, 
and even a lawyer for the Baader-Meinhof Gang seeking asylum in France), 
and his enthusiastic support of radical Islamic self-government during the 
Iranian revolution. All of this before ancient practices of self-shaping had even 
made an appearance in his work.  
Taking Foucault at his word, then, would mean actually taking him 
seriously when he says of Greek sexual ethics that they were “disgusting,” 
and that “All of antiquity seems to [him] to have been a ‘profound error.’”29 
It would mean taking seriously the claim that the interrogation of the ethical 
practices of antiquity is not a matter of doing ethics but of writing a “history 
of desiring man... situated at the point where an archaeology of 
problematizations and a genealogy of practices of the self intersect.”30 It 
would mean recognizing that when Foucault says that he is giving, in fact, a 
genealogy of ethics, he is no more giving us an ethics than Nietzsche is giving 
us a morality with his genealogy of morality.31  
Nor should we be surprised, then, to find that a “Foucauldian” ethics has 
been subject to a battery of objections. It would be surprising, rather, if 
Foucault - despite his serious misgivings regarding Greek ethics, his 
professed lack of attention to any connection between ancient practices and 
contemporary problems, and his decided interest in investigating different 
historical modes of governmentality (of both self and others) - had somehow 
managed, as if by miraculous accident, to produce a compelling normative 
ethical theory. I hope that the evidence presented has been sufficient to 
convince one that, rather than thinking that Foucault is giving us an ethics 
and therefore leaving us with a host of problems, inconsistency or sympathy 
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for neoliberalism not least among them, we ought to employ modus tollens 
rather than modus ponens. The real question is why the latter seemed a 
compelling move in the first place.  
On the Government of Truth 
 If one were still committed to excavating something like a Foucauldian 
ethics, it strikes me that one could not very well posit an ethical “turn” in 
Foucault’s thinking, at least not simply on the basis of Foucault’s scattered 
affirmations of the importance or desirability of developing one’s life “as a 
work of art.” If one were still so inclined, it seems that the task of the (radical) 
reconstruction of a Foucauldian ethics would involve assessing the 
consistency and coherence of all these affirmations, developing their thematic 
unity, and extracting some sort of guidance from them. Or, if that task appears 
too daunting, at the very least one would have to find some way of separating 
the “genuine” or perhaps “mature” affirmations, those which actually 
represent a “coherent first-order normative outlook,” to use Nancy Fraser’s 
locution, from his “immature” ones.32  
 But we can already hear – from both Foucault’s critics and some of his 
partisans – the reply: “Precisely! The mature Foucault is the one who spent 
his last years discussing antiquity and endorsing the notion of giving a style 
to one’s life as an ethical ideal. This is simply the last word, and so we who 
would assess this ideal are obligated to flesh out what such an ethics, with all 
its potential and deficiencies, would really amount to.”  
The problem with this response is that it raises a historical accident to the 
level of Foucauldian dogma. It is certainly true that in his final years Foucault 
was working on late antiquity, and it is also true that during this period 
Foucault was explicitly fascinated by the idea of extending the realm of the 
“aesthetic” into the very stuff of one’s life or existence. He even linked this 
idea explicitly to the sort of ethos that he found in Kant, and with which he 
identified. And for a long time after his death, the extant writings gave the 
impression that these remarks were indeed Foucault’s “last word,” the 
mature hints of the ethics that had been lurking in his thought, perhaps only 
recently or perhaps all along.  
But this impression ought no longer impress us. The fact of the matter is 
that we now have at our disposal the series of lecture courses that Foucault 
gave at the Collège de France, and in particular those from the late 1970s 
through to his death, which paint a very different picture of the trajectory of 
his thought over those years. We see that Foucault’s explicit and continued 
inquiries into “biopower,” beginning with his lectures “Society Must Be 
Defended” in 1975 and in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, and 
continuing in his lectures “Security, Territory, Population” and “The Birth of 
Biopolitics,” of 1978 and 1979, respectively, led him to reformulate the object 
of his genealogies as “governmentality.” Government, and in particular our 
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government by the truth, forms his constant concern. Indeed, we see from 
1978 onward a concern with the development of a pastoral form of political 
power, incorporating religious modes of governance developed in the middle 
ages. We know that his first steps toward looking at the conditions of the 
possibility of this form of religious governance in Late Antiquity are taken in 
the 1979/1980 lecture courses “The Government of the Living.” As he puts it: 
This year's course drew support from the analyses done the 
preceding years [i.e. precisely in Security, Territory, 
Population and The Birth of Biopolitics] on the subject of 
"government," this notion being understood in the broad 
sense of techniques and procedures for directing human 
behavior... Inside this very general framework, we studied 
the problem of self-examination and confession... The 
question raised is this one, then: How is it that in Western 
Christian culture the government of men demands, on the 
part of those who are led, not only acts of obedience and 
submission but also "acts of truth," which have the peculiar 
requirement not just that the subject tell the truth but that 
he tell the truth about himself, his faults, his desires, the 
state of his soul, and so on? How was a type of government 
of men formed in which one is required not simply to obey 
but to reveal what one is by stating it?33 
No mention of ethics, but rather an explicit continuation of Foucault’s 
genealogy of governmentality. As his investigations reach further into the 
ancient Greek world, he explains further: 
[It was] a question of beginning an inquiry concerning the 
instituted models of self-knowledge and their history: How 
was the subject established, at different moments and in 
different institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or 
even indispensable object of knowledge? How were the 
experience that one may have of oneself and the knowledge 
that one forms of oneself organized according to certain 
schemes? How were these schemes defined, valorized, 
recommended, imposed? It is clear that neither the recourse 
to an original experience nor the study of the philosophical 
theories of the soul, the passions, or the body can serve as 
the main axis in such an investigation.  
One could be forgiven for thinking that one was reading a preface to Discipline 
and Punish. But this is Foucault’s reflection on the course immediately 
following The Government of the Living, entitled “Subjectivity and Truth.” He 
continues: 
The guiding thread that seems the most useful for this 
inquiry is constituted by what one might call the 
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"techniques of the self," which is to say, the procedures, 
which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or 
prescribed to individuals in order to determine their 
identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain 
number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-
knowledge. In short, it is a matter of placing the imperative 
to "know oneself" - which to us appears so characteristic of 
our civilization - back in the much broader interrogation 
that serves as its explicit or implicit context: What should 
one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on 
the self? How should one "govern oneself" by performing 
actions in which one is oneself the objective of those actions, 
the domain in which they are brought to bear, the 
instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?34 
The point here is that the “techniques of the self” are not some sort of ethical 
response to the problems of contemporary society, but a domain to be 
investigated precisely in order to determine how people were led to or 
prescribed certain ways of relating to themselves that made them objects of 
knowledge. Foucault repeats himself at Dartmouth College: 
I conceived of a rather odd project: not the study of the 
evolution of sexual behavior but of the historical study of 
the link between the obligation to tell the truth and the 
prohibitions weighing on sexuality. I asked: How had the 
subject been compelled to decipher himself in regard to 
what was forbidden? It is a question that interrogates the 
relation between asceticism and truth. Max Weber posed 
the question: If one wants to behave rationally and regulate 
one's action according to true principles, what part of one's 
self should one renounce? What is the ascetic price of 
reason? To what kind of asceticism should one submit? I 
posed the opposite question: How have certain kinds of 
interdictions required the price of certain kinds of 
knowledge about oneself? What must one know about 
oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?... Thus, 
I arrived at the hermeneutics of technologies of the self in 
pagan and early Christian practice.35  
Note that, if Foucault really were looking for something like an “ethics” 
or a “normative foundation” for his work, or for resistance in the present, or 
something of that ilk, it would make the most sense to pose a variant of 
Weber’s question: if I want to act in accordance with true (ethical) principles, 
what part of myself ought I renounce? How do we overcome or transform 
those parts of ourselves that are shaped or formed or constituted by “power”? 
But this is not Foucault’s question. Rather, the question is something more 
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like: “Into which technologies and practices of truth-telling must one be 
initiated in order to be governed?”  
 Arnold Davidson may be correct in noting that understanding 
“sexuality” is not in fact the main aim of Foucault’s late work, but seems 
clearly mistaken in thinking that the point of his interest in “the history of 
ancient sex... was part of his interest in ancient ethics.”36 Rather, ancient ethics  
articulates one set of techniques, among others, by which we have subjected 
ourselves, one mode of governing our relation to the truth in a long history of 
them. Consider the following remark, from The Hermeneutics of the Subject: 
I have tried to show you that the role and function of ascesis 
- in the sense that Greek and Roman philosophers gave to 
to the word askēsis - was to establish the strongest possible 
link between the subject and truth... The ascesis constitutes, 
therefore, and its role is to constitute, the subject as subject 
of veridiction [i.e. truth-telling].37 
Earlier in the same course, Foucault makes the same point, while establishing 
the continuity of this interrogation of Plutarch and Aurelius with his earlier 
work: 
... at the heart of the problem I want to pose this year - and 
what’s more have wanted to pose for some time - ... is: How 
is the relationship between truth-telling (veridiction) and 
the practice of the subject established, fixed, and defined? 
Or, more generally, how are truth-telling and governing 
(governing oneself and others) linked and connected to 
each other? I have tried to look at this problem under a 
whole range of aspects and forms - whether with regard to 
madness, mental illness, prison, delinquency, etcetera - ... I 
would now like to pose this question of the relationship 
between truth-telling and the government of the subject in 
ancient thought before Christianity... in the form and 
within the framework of a of a constitution of a relationship 
of self to self...38 
At each turn, the question of the relation to the self, the techniques of the self, 
the “aesthetics of existence” are referred to a larger investigation of how the 
subject is governed by its relations to the truth, and how in turn “the 
formation of a certain type of experience of the self became possible which is, 
it seems to me, typical of Western experience... but also of the experience the 
Western subject may have or create of others.”39  
 One might here think that Foucault is engaged in revisionist history, 
that his concerns with veridiction and subjectivity must be late additions to 
his work. But this would be to ignore, for example, the detailed analysis of 
techniques for securing and extracting truth in early modern judicial 
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proceedings in his 1971 lectures in Brazil on “Truth and Juridical Form” 
(material discussed also at length in Discipline and Punish).40 In fact, it might 
be that, rather than either power or subjectivity, it is “truth” or “truth-
regimes” or “regimes of veridiction” that are in fact the original objects of 
Foucault’s work from at least his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 
1970, at the beginning of what could be called his “genealogical” period:  
I want to try to discover how this choice of truth, inside 
which we are caught but which we ceaselessly renew, was 
made - but also how it was repeated, renewed, and 
displaced. I will consider first the epoch of the Sophists at 
its beginning, with Socrates or, at least with Platonic 
philosophy, to see how efficacious discourse, ritual 
discourse, discourse loaded with powers and perils, 
gradually came to conform to a distinction between true 
and false discourse.41  
We see here that not only did Foucault begin his genealogies in 1970 with an 
inquiry into the different ways in which we might bind ourselves to truth, 
compel ourselves to speak it, but that he did so precisely by turning to the 
Greeks, to a great extent the subject of his first course. In fact, the same themes 
that appear in 1970 - such as that of the sumbolon, or the “half-truth” as a way 
of relating to truth in Greek tragedy, and especially in Oedipus, where truth 
is linked explicitly to power - return to the center of Foucault’s concern in 
1983.42 The Greeks, for Foucault, do not appear first as the exemplars of a free 
art of living safe from the vicissitudes of disciplinary power, but as an early 
and decisive episode in the history of ways we have subjected ourselves, in 
this case by making ourselves accountable to the truth.  
 Indeed, the later return to the ancient world as a whole, despite the 
significance placed on it by commentators as Foucault’s “final” work, does 
not even appear to be intended as more than a quick one; in “The Courage of 
Truth: The Government of Self and Others II” (note that both of his final 
lecture courses contain a reference not to ethics but to government), Foucault 
says: 
The lectures I would like to give will no doubt be somewhat 
disjointed because they deal with things that I would like 
to have done with, as it were, in order to return, after this 
several years long Greco-Roman “trip,” to some 
contemporary problems which I will deal with either in the 
second part of the course, or possibly in the form of a 
working seminar.43 
This remark seems designed to ward off misunderstandings, as he repeats a 
sentiment he had expressed days earlier in an interview, when asked about 
the contemporary ethical significance of his work:   
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I must admit that I have not gone very far in that direction 
and I would rather come back to some contemporary 
problems, in order to try and see what we can do with all 
that in the actual political problematic… I don’t like 
answering questions which I have not examined. I would, 
however, like to take up once again [in the contemporary 
world] those questions I have raised through the culture of 
Antiquity.44 
Foucault never had the chance to move beyond the ancient world, but we 
have good reason to think that he would have. The final course was incredibly 
truncated on account of his rapidly deteriorating health, and he would be 
dead within months. Nevertheless, it’s clear that it is truth-telling in all of its 
historicity, the different “games of truth” and “regimes of veridiction” and 
the manners in which these games and regimes are governed and have played 
a role in making us who we are here and now, is the focus of Foucault’s 
research. The task - too large to begin here - of explicating in detail the 
structure of veridiction and governmentality, and their theoretical and 
practical significance, but their centrality to Foucault’s thought is beyond 
dispute.   
Now, one could try to make a case that the practice of ancient parrhesia or 
truth-telling, which interested Foucault in his very final courses at the Collège 
de France, is an ethically exemplary technology of self, an aesthetic of existence 
or manner of caring for the self in which we can find at the least the germ of 
a normative ethic of resistance for contemporary life. One could argue that at 
the very end of his life, Foucault had found, through his continued 
investigations into the political stakes of “veridiction,” the basis for a new 
ethics. But this would require an independent conviction that giving us an 
ethics is what Foucault is primarily up to. It would mean rejecting out of hand 
Foucault’s claim he is not looking for solutions to our present moral problems 
in other solutions to other problems, and that indeed he was not looking such 
solutions to begin with.45 It would require explaining why Foucault’s alleged 
foray into “ethics” seems rather to consist in extended discussions of truth-
telling and governmentality, and why he had hoped to be done with his little 
“trip” and to return to investigations of the “contemporary problematic.”  
One would have to explain why Foucault describes his work in 1982 not as 
ethics but as a “series of studies of ‘the arts of oneself,’ that is, the aesthetics 
of existence and the government of oneself and others,” in effect assimilating 
discussion of the practices of the self to a series of studies on governmentality, 
begun (at the latest) in 1977.46 One would have to explain why parrhesia is not 
rather just one mode of truth-telling, in all of its relations to power and 
government, among all the others that Foucault explored. In other words, it 
would be up to the partisan of Foucauldian ethics to explain how parrhesia, 
the ethics of truth-telling, the care of the self, or “aesthetics of existence,” the 
emergence of all these techniques by which an individual may establish a 
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relation with herself, are not, on the contrary, nuances in the history of our 
government by truth.  
 We have already seen the genuine continuity of the problematic of 
truth, and of government by the truth, through his lectures. And he confirms 
this in his published monographs, for example, in the “Introduction” to the 
second volume of  The History of Sexuality, where Foucault tries to explain to 
his readers the glaring shift in historical material from the Victorians to the 
Greeks, he states that “[a]fter first studying the games of truth in their 
interplay with one another... and then their interaction with power relations, 
as exemplified by punitive practices - I felt obliged to study the games of truth 
in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, 
taking as my domain of reference and field of investigation what might be 
called ‘the history of desiring man.’”47 Again, we see the importance of the 
“games of truth,” of the rules and strategies that govern our relations to the 
truth, but no mention of ethics. When in 1984, interviewers try to insinuate 
that there had indeed been a “break” between this work and prior 
investigations, all Foucault will admit is that he had been brought to take 
account of the ways in which subject act on themselves in the process of 
subject-formation in a more explicit way than he had before. It is striking, I 
think, that Foucault – even at this very late stage – resists characterizing his 
work in ethical terms. This is not what one would expect of an author 
allegedly “turning” to “ethics.” It is, however, rather unsurprising if one 
recalls Foucault’s actually stated interests in investigating, variously, 
strategies of government and pragmatics of subject-formation, all of these 
reversible, alternately threatening and oppressive and empowering and free.  
Towards a Genealogy of Neoliberal Veridiction 
 By way of closing remarks, I want to suggest a different approach to 
situating Foucault’s discussion of neoliberalism in his larger genealogy of the 
government of truth. It should be difficult to ignore the fact that, even in his 
explicit engagements with bio-politics and governmentality in the 20th 
century, veridiction was at the center of his concerns: 
It is not so much the history of the true or the history of the 
false as the history of veridiction which has a political 
significance. That is what I wanted to say regarding the 
question of the market or, let’s say, of the connecting up of a 
regime of truth to governmental practice.48 
Foucault was particularly interested in how the market became a site of 
veridiction, and how truth – as produced in the market, spoken in and about 
the market – supersedes the application of justice: 
In simple and barbaric terms, let’s say that from being a site 
of jurisdiction, which it remained up to the start of the 
eighteenth century, the market … is becoming what I will 
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call a site of veridiction. The market must tell the truth; it 
must tell the truth in relation to governmental practice.49 
And there can be no doubt about these specific transformations for Foucault: 
Speaking in general terms, let’s say that in this history of a 
jurisdictional and then veridictional market we have one of 
those innumerable intersections between jurisdiction and 
veridiction that is undoubtedly a fundamental 
phenomenon in the history of the modern West.50 
Whatever Foucault means by justice and truth, whatever he thinks of the 
imbrications of the normative and descriptive, it seems clear that we need to 
consider his investigations of neoliberal governmentality in terms of the form 
of veridiction to which it responds, and their conditions. Neoliberalism, 
whatever else it is and has been, is a way in which we are governed by the 
truth, in a long history of such government.  
 There are multiple directions from which one might begin to approach 
this genealogy.  One could begin by considering how the characterization of 
individuals as agents of market-exchange in neoliberal thought places a 
specific conception of desire at the heart of politics. If, as seen above, the 
market comes be a “site of veridiction,” we might ask just what it is that comes 
to have its truth manifested in such a site. The answer, I take it, is desire – even 
if only in the de-libidinized form of interest or preferences. In making the 
avenues of free satisfaction of interest central to both self and politics, 
neoliberal governmentality can be seen as a reversal of traditional 
“repressive” moralities, in the name of a libidinal politics. There is some 
recent work in this direction.51 If one were to emphasize this productive and 
channelled unleashing of desire in liberal governmentality, one might view a 
transformative relationship to one’s own desire at the heart of resistance to 
neoliberalism. One could read Foucault’s claim that the “philosophy of the 
future, if it exists, must be born outside of Europe or equally in consequence 
of meetings and impacts of Europe and non-Europe” in this light.52 Foucault 
makes this claim to a Zen practitioner, in the context of discussing his interest 
in Zen. Foucault notes the importantly different and new ways in which Zen 
practice allows one to be aware of new and different relations between mind 
and body; this seems to echo his famous allusions to a new and different 
“economy of bodies and pleasures” beyond the apparatus of sexuality. As a 
branch of Buddhism, of course, Zen practice emphasises detachment and – 
especially – an end to pernicious craving, or desires. This is far too crude, as it 
stands, but the basic idea is clear; if we are governed through our desire, then 
we must learn to desire differently.  
 Whatever one thinks about the general strategy of transforming – 
perhaps even transcending – desire, it cannot be the end of the story with 
respect to placing neoliberalism in a history of the government by the truth. 
Placing desire at the heart of a genealogy of neoliberalism would require an 
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account of how desire became central to our identity. In other words, it would 
require an account of how, when we speak the truth about ourselves, desire, 
the will, the flesh all come to hold centre stage. We have some sense of what 
this might look like; it is the story that Foucault tells from the first volume of 
the History of Sexuality, which he construes as an “archaeology of 
psychoanalysis” and winding through Christian practices of confession and 
deep into classical Antiquity in the latter volumes. In its broad strokes, this 
narrative is familiar. We move from finding the truth of ourselves in, say, 
erotic action, the use of pleasures, to the disturbances within our psyche, to 
concupiscence and ultimately the “flesh,” which become the fertile ground of 
contemporary sexuality. And no doubt this story important, but it would still 
miss the character of the neoliberal relation to truth.   
 I want to close by suggesting that a promising – and, to my knowledge, 
unexplored - avenue of research for exploring the neoliberal regime of truth 
might look to the sort of progression that truth-telling follows for Foucault in 
antiquity. Foucault’s interest in parrhesia begins with the alleged “crisis of 
democratic parrhesia” in ancient Athens. Using the plays of Euripides as 
examples of the vicissitudes of democratic truth-telling in debates over 
military engagement, the right of citizens to free speech comes to be 
problematized (in ways that seem more contemporary than we might have 
thought). Should everyone be permitted to speak the truth? Should the right to 
parrhesia be restricted to those with certain qualities and virtues? It is in this 
context that Foucault places the classical Greek philosophy that will, 
eventually, give rise to the hermeneutics of the self; in the case of Socrates and 
Plato, the problematization of parrhesia leads to concern for the soul, in its 
essential desire for the Good and its quest for truth.  
 This will become, for Foucault, a central question: who can tell the truth 
in the exercise of power? How does one come to learn to exercise power – over 
oneself and over others – and whose help is required? He traces the relation of 
Plato’s philosophical advice to Dion of Syracuse in The Government of Self and 
Others, to Plutarch’s outline of the parrhesiast as he who will be frank in his 
opinions with one in The Courage of Truth. The theme of the partner or advisor 
resurfaces again and again, as the one who will speak the truth to power. 
Indeed, it is with the theme of advising the Prince, or the Tyrant, with respect 
to the mastery of his desires that Foucault ends his 1980 lectures on Subjectivity 
and Truth: 
A fundamental problem is posed in this way: that of the 
prince’s power over others and of the technology of 
himself, of the prince as subject, of the prince inasmuch as 
he governs others and has to govern himself. It seems to me 
that the problem of governmentality…in all its dimensions 
appears quite clearly in this literature…53 
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The basic point to be made here is that, for Foucault, the crucial questions 
concern who can tell the truth, what sort of person they must be, and what 
sorts of truths they must know in order to wield power, along with questions 
of who can teach them, who can train them, and from whom they must learn. 
In the ancient world, addressing these concerns broached the issues of 
spirituality, transformation, and the purification of the subject, of the 
possibility of accessing the truth, and the role of the “spiritual advisor” or 
philosopher in all this. In the modern world, the same issues remain. Foucault 
seems to admit as much at the end of his life:   
With the notion of parrhesia, originally rooted in political 
practice and the problematization of democracy, then later 
diverging towards the sphere of personal ethics and the 
formation of the moral subject, with this notion with 
political roots and its divergence into morality, we have… 
the possibility of posing the question of the subject and 
truth from the point of view of the practice of what could 
be called the government of oneself and others. And thus 
we come back to the theme of government which I studied 
some years ago. It seems to me that by examining the notion 
of parrhesia we can see how the analysis of modes of 
veridiction, the study of techniques of governmentality, 
and the identification of forms of practice of self 
interweave. Connecting together modes of veridiction, 
techniques of governmentality, and practices of the self is 
basically what I have always been trying to do.54 
In this context, Foucault’s first investigations into the history of 
biopolitics, which would grow into his discussion of neoliberalism can be read 
as centring around “a problem in political pedagogy: What must the prince 
know, where and from whom must he acquire his knowledge, and who is 
qualified to constitute the knowledge of the prince?”55 Indeed, it is worth 
noting that his interrogation of German ordoliberalism – his first extended 
analysis of neoliberal government – explicitly foregrounds it as a response to 
a political crisis, a problematization of democracy in the reconstruction of 
post-World War II Germany. We can perhaps, then, view the history of 
neoliberalism as part of the history of struggles over our truths, those truths 
that need to be known to govern us, and who is qualified to tell them. 
 For example, Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah have recently 
argued that histories of neoliberalism that focus on the insufficiency of 
neoclassical models of economic rationality miss the point. Neoliberalism, as 
a political project, has been from the beginning embroiled in struggles for 
scientific credibility; this is revealed by the central place it gives to information, 
parroting the discourses of the post-war social sciences. The importantly 
novel upshots of this transformation of economic discourse is to (a) reify 
information, separating it entirely from actual knowers and agents, and (b) 
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rendering this information opaque to all but those who can design the proper 
markets to reveal it.56 And, of course, when we participate in markets 
designed in accord with specific aims, we become subject to ever new norms 
for how best to comport ourselves within them, and ever new truths about 
our desires.  
 There is no question of unpacking Foucault’s meticulous histories of 
German ordoliberalism or Chicago School economics here. But I want to 
suggest that we should at the very least place at the forefront of our 
interpretations of his thought the question of how truth-telling, the will to know 
the truth, along with the various ways that the truth that we can tell is produced, 
how observations are regimented, experimental apparatuses arranged, and so 
on. What sorts of truth are required to govern us, and how does this 
government integrate our ethos? How does one become obliged by the truth, 
and how does this obligation impact our comportment? It might not even be 
surprising to find that Foucault’s “historical ontology” – the historico-
philosophical investigation of how we are constituted as subjects, of 
knowledge, power, and ethics - is, behind its Kantian face, at its Nietzschean 
roots, an investigation of truth, of what it does to us, of what we might do 
with it, and of those domains in which we might have done with it.  
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